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by Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls and Ulrich J. Wagner ∗
The criteria proposed by the EU Commission to iden-
tify industries that will receive free emission permits
in the third phase of the European Union Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) are not restrictive enough.
Evidence from interviews with almost 800 managers in
Europe shows that most of the sectors entitled to free
emission permits are not facing an increased risk of clo-
sure or relocation outside of the EU as a consequence of
permit auctioning. Free permit allocation is therefore
just a transfer of tax payers’ money to industry with-
out any additional social benefit. We propose a simple
modification of the Commission’s criteria for free per-
mit allocation which could save European tax payers at
least €7 billion annually.
The evidence
The EU Commission is currently finalising the design
of the third trading phase of the European Emissions
Trading System, which will begin in January 2013 and
last until 2020. It is the Commission’s stated objec-
tive to increase the share of emission permits that are
auctioned rather than allocated for free to installations
covered by the EU ETS. This would improve the fair-
ness of the scheme because the current practice of allo-
cating free permits on the basis of past emissions effec-
tively rewards businesses that have been lagging behind
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with measures to reduce emissions. Permit auction-
ing would also provide additional revenue for govern-
ments to pay for R&D and infrastructure investments
required for the transition to a low-carbon economy.
The auction revenue could further be used to compen-
sate low-income groups in the event that carbon pricing
has regressive distributional effects or simply help to
balance overly strained government budgets. Notwith-
standing the high priority given to permit auctioning,
European lawmakers have recently proposed criteria
to determine which industrial sectors should continue
to receive free permits during the third phase of the
EU ETS. Under these criteria 147 sectors - more than
half of the 258 manufacturing sectors under consider-
ation - will be eligible for free permits, although in
practice not all of these sectors include firms that are
regulated by the EU ETS. This follows pressure from
industry groups claiming that more stringent carbon
pricing under the EU ETS will provoke job losses and
cause carbon-intensive production to re-locate outside
the EU – a process referred to as “carbon leakage”.
In recent research we investigate how well the proposed
criteria for exemption from auctioning capture the risk
of downsizing or plant closure, and what the implica-
tions are in terms of job losses, carbon leakage and
CO2 emissions.1 Our analysis is based on data from
approximately 800 interviews with managers in manu-
facturing plants – both members and non-members of
the EU ETS – in six EU countries (Belgium, France,
Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK).2 For each in-
1 For the complete study, see Anderson, B., Leib, J., Mar-
tin, R., McGuigan, M., Muûls, M., de Preux, L., and Wagner,
U.J., (2010),“Climate Change Policy and Business in Europe –
Evidence from interviewing managers”, CEP Discussion Paper,
LSE, forthcoming.
2 The interviews were conducted via telephone between Au-
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2terviewed firm we rate on a scale from 1 to 5 the like-
lihood and degree of downsizing in response to future
climate policy. A score of 1 corresponds to no expected
impact from climate policy whereas a score of 5 indi-
cates a high likelihood that the firm is going to close
down or re-locate in response to tighter climate policy.
Fig. 1: Average risk of downsizing score across sectors
Notes: The bars show the sector level average score measuring
the risk of downsizing as a consequence of climate policy. The
segments represent the confidence bands, calculated at the 95%
level.
The main results of the analysis are summarised as
follows:
• Among the principal manufacturing indus-
tries we sampled, there is not one for which
the average firm is at risk of relocation or
closure (see Figure 1). There is only one sec-
tor (Other Minerals) where the average score is
slightly above 3, implying downsizing by at least
10% of employment or output. For a few sectors
(Iron and Steel, Ceramics, Glass, Fuels) the 95%
confidence band around the average score which
visualizes the uncertainty associated with the es-
timates in Figure 1 includes a score of 3. In no
case does the confidence band include the maxi-
mum score, meaning that the possibility of com-
plete relocation in response to carbon pricing is
very unlikely.
• The EU Commission bases its assessment of sec-
tors at risk of carbon leakage on two statistics,
namely the carbon intensity (VaS) and the trade
intensity (TI).3 We examine how well these statis-
tics capture downsizing risk by correlating them
gust and November of 2009. The interview questions focused
on companies’ management practices related to climate change
and touched upon various aspects of climate policy-making in
Europe.
3 Carbon intensity is measured as the amount of carbon a
sector emits divided by its value added. In previous studies on
the topic this has been referred to as Value at Stake (VaS), a
convention we adopt in this briefing. The Commissions defines
the trade intensity as the value of imports and exports to non
EU countries over the total market size of the sector within the
EU.
with our score. Plotting carbon and trade in-
tensities of 3-digit sectors against downsizing risk
scores, as shown in Figure 2, reveals that VaS is
strongly correlated with downsizing risk whereas
TI is not. This suggests that using the trade in-
tensity criterion to determine which sectors
should be exempt from auctioning is bound
to lead to exemptions for firms that are not
at all at risk of downsizing or carbon leak-
age. A plausible explanation for the poor perfor-
mance of the TI criterion is that downsizing risk is
not only determined by the cost impact of carbon
taxation and by the tradeability of the products of
a sector but also by location specific factors such
as the skill of the workforce, agglomeration bene-
fits, or the stability of institutions. To the extent
that such factors are essential for the success of
the firm’s business model they take priority over
concerns about carbon or energy costs, yet the
TI criterion is unlikely to capture these factors.
Lumping together exports and imports, the TI cri-
terion can be high because of strong non-EU com-
petition (which increases the risk of carbon leak-
age) but also because location specific advantages
enable EU firms to export more (which reduces
the risk of carbon leakage). Moreover, on the im-
port side, the TI criterion does not differentiate
between trade with non-EU countries that have
binding emission targets under the Kyoto Proto-
col and trade with non-EU countries that do not
have such commitments.
Fig. 2: Correlation between downsizing risk and inten-
sity measures
Notes: Each 3-digit (NACE 1.1) sector is represented by one
green and one red point. The horizontal axis measures for
red points normalised CO2 intensity (VaS) and for green points
normalised trade intensity (TI). The vertical axis measures the
downsizing risk score derived from the interviews with managers.
The two lines represent the fitted values for each set of points.
• We further examine the EU criteria by looking
at the specific thresholds that are currently sug-
gested. According to the Commission’s proposal
sectors will be exempt from auctioning if their
3carbon intensity is very high (VaS>30%), if their
trade intensity is very high (TI>30%) or if both
trade and carbon intensity are moderately high
(VaS>5% & TI>10%). We find that the Com-
mission’s thresholds lead to an exemption
from auctioning of 60 to 88% of CO2 emis-
sions from the manufacturing sector regu-
lated under the EU ETS.4 This is illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4.
Fig. 3: Value at Stake and Trade Intensity of sectors in
the interview sample
Notes: The figure plots the position of the sectors included in
our interview sample in terms of the two criteria proposed for
exempting sectors from auctioning of permits. The size of the
circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given 4-digit
industry (NACE 1.1 classification). The rectangles A, B and
C represent the three sets of eligible sectors defined by the EU
Commission’s thresholds for the two criteria. The solid lines
show mean trade and carbon intensities, and the dotted lines
represent the respective employment-weighted means.
• The thresholds proposed by the EU Commission
implicitly define three groups of exempted sectors,
depicted as the rectangles A, B, and C in Figure
3 . It is striking that group B contains a partic-
ularly heterogenous group of industries, namely a
4 The actual number is uncertain because (i) the EU Com-
mission’s analysis at the 4-digit sectoral level is based in part
on estimates and interpolations and (ii) the Commission makes
only part of their data available to the public. We use two alter-
native methods of calculating carbon emissions. First, we match
installation level data on carbon emissions in the current trading
period taken from the Community International Transaction Log
(CITL) with firm level data from the ORBIS firm level database.
This is necessary to determine the sector an installation belongs
to and to match CITL data to our interview data. Not all instal-
lations in the CITL can be matched in this way because lookup
tables are not available in some countries. Unsuccessful matches
are more likely for smaller firms that are less carbon and trade
intensive, so we expect that this leads to an underestimation of
the share of firms in the exempted category. This is the basis of
our higher figure of 88% (CITL&ORBIS in Figure 4). Second,
we use data on sectoral carbon emissions taken from the EU’s
impact assessment (IA in Figure 4) documents for EU ETS phase
3. Since these data include emissions from both firms regulated
under the EU ETS and firms that are not, this method is likely
to underestimate the share of exempted firms. This leads to the
lower estimate of 60%.
Fig. 4: Relative size of the sectoral groupings
Notes: The figure plots, for each set of sectors as described on
the horizontal axis, the shares in the total number of firms, total
employment as well as on the basis of two different ways of mea-
suring total CO2 emissions. For a discussion of the differences
between the two CO2 measures see Footnote 4.
large number of industries with very low carbon
intensity as well as a few sectors with moderate
carbon intensity. We thus further subdivide this
group by carbon intensity and analyse the follow-
ing 4 groups:
1. high carbon intensity: VaS>30% (Group A)
2. high trade intensity and moderate carbon in-
tensity: TI>30% and 5%<VaS<30% (Group
B & VaS>5%)
3. high trade intensity and very low carbon in-
tensity: TI>30% and VaS<5% (Group B &
VaS<5%)
4. moderate trade and carbon intensity:
5%<VaS<30% & 10%<TI<30% (Group C)
Figure 5 plots the average downsizing risk and as-
sociated 95% confidence bands for these groups.
It is evident that only carbon intensive firms
(group A) and the more carbon-intensive
among the trade-intensive firms (group B
& VaS>5%) are at heightened risk of out-
sourcing a significant part of their produc-
tion.5
Policy recommendations
Adjusting the thresholds for exemptions Our anal-
ysis of risk scores in different exemption groups sug-
gests that it is only in sectors with very high carbon
intensity (Group A) or in sectors with high trade and
moderate carbon intensity (Group B & VaS>5%) that
there is a heightened - although not dramatic - risk
of downsizing. Exempting only those two groups from
permit auctioning would thus considerably increase the
5 This finding is corroborated in multivariate regressions that
control for confounding factors.
4Fig. 5: Impact measures across “at risk” groups
Notes: The green bars represent, for each set of firms as de-
scribed on the horizontal axis, the average score measuring the
risk of downsizing as a consequence of climate policy. The or-
ange segments represent the confidence bands, calculated at the
95% level. The chart is based on the sample of interviewed EU
ETS firms.
amount of permits auctioned during the third phase of
the EU ETS without aggravating the overall risk of job
losses and carbon leakage in the EU ETS. This could
be achieved by modifiying the thresholds as follows:
Only sectors with a carbon intensity higher than 30%
or sectors with a trade intensity greater than 10% and
carbon intensity of more than 5% should be granted
an exemption. This modification would revoke the ex-
emptions currently envisaged for groups C and B &
VaS<5%. By a conservative estimate this would pro-
vide an additional revenue for European governments
of at least €7 billion annually.6
Reconsidering the trade criterion We find no evi-
dence that the trade intensity criterion reliably mea-
sures the risk of downsizing or closure across sec-
tors. The European Commission should therefore in
the longer run replace this criterion with one that
more accurately reflects a sector’s vulnerability to car-
bon leakage. The trade intensity measure potentially
misses an important aspect that determines vulnera-
bility, namely locational specificity. The more strongly
a firm benefits from factors that are specific to the EU
such as the skill set of the workforce, agglomeration
economies, the stability of institutions, etc., the less
likely it is to shift production abroad in response to
EU climate change policy. More research into the mea-
surement of locational specificity is needed before this
concept can be operationalised in EU climate change
policy. An alternative criterion that is more easily
6 To compute this figure we multiply the share of emissions in
groups C and B & VaS<5% implied by our match between CITL
and ORBIS data (see Footnote 4) with the total emissions figure
from the CITL excluding power plant emissions. Alternatively
we can use the share of emissions in C and B & VaS<5% that
is implied by the EU Impact Assessment figures. This leads to
an estimate of additional revenue of approximately €9 billion.
We follow the EU Impact Assessment and assume an average
revenue per permit of €30. Table 1 lists the sectors currently
exempted from auctioning, which would cease to be exempted
under the suggested rule changes.
amenable to objective measurement could be the share
of competition from outside the EU.7 It might equally
be worthwhile to explore if more sophisticated versions
of the TI criterion – such as, for example, the share of
imports into the EU from emerging economies – per-
form better.
Conclusion
Despite many design improvements there is a concern
that even in the third phase of the EU ETS the Com-
mission is accommodating the interests of the industry
lobby too generously at the expense of European tax-
payers. However, there is still a window of opportunity
for European governments to improve the design of the
EU ETS significantly while raising additional income
on the order of €7 billion annually. Rather than pro-
viding an unspecific subsidy for industry this money
could be earmarked to finance investments and R&D
crucial for the transition to a low-carbon economy. It
could equally be used to mitigate possibly regressive
effects of higher carbon prices on low-income groups.
Finally, it could help to balance strained government
budgets in the wake of the recent financial and eco-
nomic crises.
7 We construct such a measure on the basis of our manage-
ment interviews and find it to be strongly correlated with the
downsizing risk score.
5Tab. 1: List of additional sectors not to be exempted from auctioning
Sector Descripton Sector Descripton
Processing and preserving of fsh and fsh products 152 2615
Manufacture of crude oils and fats 1541 262
Manufacture of starches and starch products 1562 Manufacture of ceramic tles and fags 263
Manufacture of sugar 1583 Producton of abrasive products 2681
Manufacture of distlled potable alcoholic beverages 1591 Manufacture of tubes 272
Producton of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 1592 Precious metals producton 2741
Manufacture of wines 1593 Lead, zinc and tn producton 2743
Manufacture of other non-distlled fermented beverages 1595 Manufacture of cutlery 2861
Preparaton and spinning of woollen-type fbres 1712 Manufacture of tools 2862
Preparaton and spinning of worsted-type fbres 1713 2874
Preparaton and spinning of fax-type fbres 1714 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 2875
1715 291
Manufacture of sewing threads 1716 Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners 2921
Preparaton and spinning of other textle fbres 1717 Manufacture of non-domestc cooling and ventlaton equipment 2923
Textle weaving 172 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 2924
Manufacture of made-up textle artcles, except apparel 174 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 293
Manufacture of other textles 175 Manufacture of machine- tools 294
Manufacture of knited and crocheted fabrics 176 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 295
Manufacture of knited and crocheted artcles 177 Manufacture of weapons and ammuniton 296
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 182 Manufacture of electric domestc appliances 2971
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of artcles of fur 183 Manufacture of ofce machinery and computers 300
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311
192 Manufacture of electricity distributon and control apparatus 312
Manufacture of footwear 193 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313
201 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary bateries 314
Manufacture of artcles of cork, straw and plaitng materials 2052 Manufacture of lightng equipment and electric lamps 315
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 211 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 3162
Manufacture of wallpaper 2124 321
Other publishing 2215 322
Manufacture of refned petroleum products 232 323
Processing of nuclear fuel 233 331
Manufacture of dyes and pigments 2412 332
242 Manufacture of optcal instruments and photographic equipment 334
244 Manufacture of watches and clocks 335
Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparatons 2452 Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
Manufacture of essental oils 2463 Manufacture of aircraf and spacecraf 353
Manufacture of photographic chemical material 2464 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 354
Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media 2465 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 355
Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2466 Manufacture of jewellery and related artcles 362
Manufacture of man-made fbres 247 Manufacture of musical instruments 363
Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes 2511 Manufacture of sports goods 364
Manufacture of fat glass 2611 Manufacture of games and toys 365
Manufacture of hollow glass 2613 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 366
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
Manufacture and processing of other glass including technical 
glassware
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for 
constructon purposes; manufacture of refractory ceramic 
Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and 
springs
Throwing and preparaton of silk, including from noils, and 
throwing and texturing of synthetc or artfcial flament yarns
Manufacture of machinery for the producton and use of 
mechanical power, except aircraf, vehicle and cycle engines
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and 
harness
Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnaton of wood
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components
Manufacture of television and radio transmiters and  apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testng, navigatng and other purposes, except 
industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of pestcides and other agro-chemical products
Manufacture of pharmaceutcals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products
Notes: The table lists sectors that under current EU Commission rules would be exempted from auctioning but under our proposed rule
change would not longer be exempted. This list contains about half of the sectors currently exempted under EU Commission proposals.
The EU rules apply at the 4 digit (NACE Rev. 1.1) sectoral level. For conciseness we report the 3-digit sector if all 4-digit sub sectors in
a 3-digit sector would cease to be exempted.
